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Abstract 
This paper seeks to determine ways to identify NCOs (Non-Conventional 
Organizations). Over the recent period, we have identified a number of NCOs (Ford, Zara, 
GM, Duolingo, Toyota, Amazon, Apple, Grameen Bank, DabbaWallah, etc.), arranging 
their inventions and innovations using two models (the 4+2 formula and the COVΛ 
organizational model). We also discuss the roles that may facilitate becoming an NCO. 
Additionally, we list the reasons for considering it important in a national economy to 
address entrepreneurs in general and specifically. Obviously, we define entrepreneurs in 
Schumpeter’s sense rather than as anyone who owns an enterprise.    
1. What are NCOs? 
NCOs (Non-Conventional Organizations) are special enterprises that have changed the 
economy in their specific fields. We clarified the definition of NCOs as part of our joint 
research with Zoltán Csigás (Csigás and Németh, 2015).   
We have already addressed the definition of entrepreneurs and enterprises in our 
previous papers (Magos and Németh, 2014), but there is also an extensive body of 
literature on the subject (e.g. Audretsch, 2002). We have also found that the owners of 
enterprises are not necessarily the same set as entrepreneurs as defined for our purposes; 
indeed, we have found the set of “real” entrepreneurs to be significantly smaller. As a 
working definition, it is sufficient to point out a critical element, which will be relevant to 
NCOs: by rearranging the system of resources and combining them in a particular and 
novel manner, the entrepreneur creates a new chain of added value, or specifically creates 
added value (creation of added value; Gray, 2002, p. 61).   
Recent years have seen great interest in startups, which marks the other direction that 
has proven to be valuable in the foundation work underlying our research. There are a 
diversity of definitions in use (Magos and Németh, 2014), and we are primarily concerned 
with their intersection.  
Based on the foregoing, NCOs can be defined as special enterprises that incorporate 
startup features in their cultures, and demonstrate, already at an early stage in their lives 
(as new enterprises), the potential of shaping their environment. Leaders of NCOs may 
appropriately be termed “real” entrepreneurs according to conventional definitions.    
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2. Why are NCOs important? What is their role in the economy  
and evolution? 
The role and weight of the SME sector is significant in every national economy. In 
Hungary, the vast majority of enterprises belong in this category (of the 555,361 
enterprises in total; 554,500 are SMEs, accounting for 99.8%, and 918 are large busines-
ses, KSH).
1
 
Unfortunately, only a fragment of these undertakings qualify as NCOs. Their 
percentage of the entire population is invisible to the unaided eye.  
 
Figure 1 (KSH data) 
 
(http://kaleidoszkop.nih.gov.hu/documents/15428/123426/kkv12) 
3. What enterprise attributes qualify a company as an NCO?  
We defined NCOs (Csigás and Németh, 2014) as having corporate capabilities (Né-
meth, 2008) that confer on them a competitive advantage which will make them highly 
successful. Success is not a sufficient condition, only the necessary minimum that 
facilitates recognition. A classic NCO is also expected to demonstrate models in terms of 
operations (modus operandi), way of thinking, dimension of culture (and mone, DNS) 
(Mérő, 2007), strategy and business which have made it successful and influence the 
thinking of others. Its developments are adopted and applied by others, even across 
industries. For a more accurate definition of the attributes, we relied on existing 
organizational models.  
Our reference comprised two models; however, our preparatory research involved an 
overview of a significant part of the relevant literature.  
One of the models is the 4+2 formula by Nohria, Joyce and Roberts (2003), the 
working definition of which we tried. The other model is the organizational model 
                                                 
1
 https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_evkozi/e_qvd022.html downloaded: 01/05/2016 
*preliminary data 
1 employee 
2-9 employees 
10-49 employees 
50-249 employees 
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implemented as part of development under grant KMOP-1.1.4-08/1-2008-0025 awarded to 
CoVa (Corporate Values Vezetési és Szervezetfejlesztési Kft.) (Németh, Kis-Tamás, Vi-
rág, Bodor, Kisházy et al., forthcoming). Nevertheless, this paper is not meant to resume 
or continue thinking along the lines of organizational excellence (for an early work on the 
subject, see Peters and Waterman: In search of excellence, 1982).   
In his recently published book, Charles Handy (2016) writes about those who hit the 
“second curve” and thereby can renew and develop. But they are also the ones who often 
influence others and in doing so, they are capable of moving not only themselves, but their 
environment, markets, industries, or even certain social processes.   
The primary elements of the 4+2 formula include strategy, structure, culture and 
execution, while its secondary elements are talent, mergers and partnerships, innovation 
and leadership. For 10 years, the Evergreen research team studied 160 organizations using 
non-participant observation methods. During that period, they observed over 200 
implemented management methodologies, which were applied by the companies with a 
view to their survival and development. At the end of the 10-year period, the success of 
the companies was analyzed in retrospect (using the indicator of total returns to 
shareholders). They identified four clusters (losers, climbers, tumblers and winners). In 
their analysis of the companies, they found that it was not possible to pick one or two ma-
nagement tools that would provide an overall solution. Despite that, a company must focus 
on all of the primary organizational dimensions listed above, and at least two of the 
secondary organizational dimensions. In other words, a company that systematically 
addresses the dimensions, implements well and uses tools in these areas, has a better 
chance of success. We designated the model as one of the cornerstones of our research due 
to the essentially empirical nature of the model.  
 
Figure 2. Components of the 4+2 formula 
 
(Nohria, Joyce and Roberts, 2003) 
 
Our second reference model is the COVΛ organizational model, where it is appropriate 
to highlight the component that represents a difference from other organizational models. 
The model incorporates the common organizational dimensions of objectives, core 
processes, results, innovativeness, culture and operation. In terms of the organizational 
model, the COVΛ adds value by proposing the alignment of the individual, the team and 
the organization in the ecosystem of the organization’s operations. This phenomenon is 
aimed at the organizational phenomenon involving the transformations between the 
various entities (individual, teams and the organization). There a number of things that are 
commonly transformed between these levels, such as information, values, knowledge, 
activity, energy, work products etc... 
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Figure 3. COVΛ organizational model 
 
(Németh et al., forthcoming) 
 
The ultimate message of both models is that if management fails to focus on the 
organizational dimensions proposed by each model, the enterprise will not reach its 
optimal level (let alone success); indeed, failure is to be expected. These organizational 
dimensions are critical to the further development and survival of enterprises.  
In our approach, innovation is cast in a particularly important role. Innovation may 
occur both accidentally and as part of conscientious research work. It is important for the 
organization to rely on novelty in the course of its operations. For our purposes, 
innovation primarily does not mean specific product or service innovation. We focus more 
closely on the organizational model (structure, mergers and partnerships), organizational 
culture, operation (modus operandi, execution), and the strategic and business models 
(strategy).  In the second part of our paper, we present examples for such innovations. 
4. Key roles in the systems of innovative enterprises 
Regarding innovation, it is important to point out that there is a considerable confusion 
of roles in the market environment, leading to countless misunderstandings and less 
efficient solutions.  
Entrepreneurs are commonly expected to be competent in whatever arises in 
connection with the enterprise. According to an earlier proposition by Gerber (2004), the 
three roles found in an enterprise (those of the technician, the manager and the 
entrepreneur) have different competencies, not to mention the differences in interests 
resulting from the achievement of objectives in the three roles. It is often the case, 
however, that in reality these roles are shared by a single person: the owner, founder and 
leader of the enterprise. This leads to a role conflict, the psychological effects of which are 
known (Goffman, 1981, 1990; Gross et al., 1973; Sarbin-Allen, 1987). A similar problem 
arises when the entrepreneur is expected to be competent in innovation and invention.  
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Therefore, a distinction must be made between the innovator and the inventor and the 
investor, any between everyone else and the entrepreneur, and not the least the manager. 
In our approach, an inventor creates something completely new (the key aspect being 
originality), while an innovator creates new things through the combination and further 
development of existing ideas (Sim; Griffin; Price; Vojak 2007). An investor is the actor 
who sees so much potential in the idea that warrants support for it. The entrepreneur is the 
one who, to simplify the picture, has the necessary risk appetite and energy to start 
creating reality from vision, but (as these competencies are rarely present in a single 
person) usually needs a good manager who will build up and move the system so that 
things actually happen. In reality, these roles are never found in a chemically pure form. 
That said, the opposite is also true: in most undertakings, the first two actors are absent or 
are only present in the organization temporarily, with a limited impact. It is important to 
point out that if the impact from the outcome of innovation fails to reach a certain 
threshold of response within the organization concerned, changes and development will 
not occur.   
Regarding NCOs, in the areas defined above, candidates are expected to produce 
inventive and innovative developments.   
5. How to find them? 
Innovations and the changes in behaviour and habit resulting from their impacts are 
known to spread at varying rates, but definitely in a viral manner. While change is 
observed only in one or two isolated places, there is no “epidemic” to talk about. By 
contrast, when the population has grown into a critical mass within society and the 
economy, the spread of change will accelerate (Barabási, 2009). When a level is reached 
at which the novelty is no longer a novelty, the change will become a social expectation—
indeed, a required minimum. The question is usually not whether a development can be 
recognized when it has approximated the critical mass. The exciting part is recognition at 
an early stage. It is typically after an event has occurred that researchers can make 
reassuring statements as to whether the event can be considered a development stage. On 
the way, one should be more cautious. Here is one example where, at this point, we are not 
in a position to determine what is actually happening—we obviously have our hypotheses, 
but the answer has yet to wait, and further observations are needed. 
 
Previous reports on the company claimed that using a novel organiza-
tional and management culture, it succeeded in achieving outstanding 
performance. The company is run according to a model of management 
and organizational culture by the name of Holacracy, which involves a 
flexible organizational structure, greater employee autonomy, meetings 
for efficient organizational operations and communications, and a unique 
decision-making process. Employees live in an autonomous community, 
are granted training opportunities, elect their own leaders, and receive 
wages on market terms (the precursor of the model may have been Mav-
erick culture, cf. Semler, 2001). Employees working in such an opera-
tional “Canaan” are economically successful. The viability of the culture 
is strongly determined its strength, which makes it essential that the loy-
alty of the team should be homogeneous.  To that end, management took 
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a bold step in 2015. They proposed the option that any employee who 
cannot identify with the company and its unique organizational culture is 
free to go and will be paid three months’ wages (that is an outstanding 
amount to be paid for voluntary exit). There are two competing hypothe-
ses. One assumes that the management needs people who reinforce the 
organizational culture. Apart from Zappos, the method has been used by 
other companies to facilitate voluntary exit. Those remaining are ex-
pected to develop stronger ties on a psychological basis. They are forced 
into a cognitive decision, which, unless they want to experience frustra-
tion due to cognitive dissonance, will result in stronger ties with their 
chosen team. This will result in increased performance for the benefit of 
the team. The only risk element is that the goal provided must be attrac-
tive enough to ensure that actors really make their decisions on a cogni-
tive basis. Over- and undercalibration will not deliver the expected im-
pact. The other hypothesis is that a culture is being built in which em-
ployees feel good. When people feel good and marvel at the methods de-
veloped by the company, what is more, even measured satisfaction indi-
cators confirm that the path taken is right, the team will stand its ground, 
whatever happens.  
Despite the above, the end of the story for Zappos was that 14% of 
employees (210 people) have left (Yahoo Finance).  
 
This raises a number of questions. The Holacracy culture of Zappos fits into the NCO 
concept we are seeking to define. Yet, at this point there are too many questions to 
determine whether the approach will stand the test of time.  
The criterion we established, i.e. that the new approach should go viral locally, spares 
us the trouble of having to process a public company database in alphabetical order. It is 
more reasonable to wait until an idea develops to a level where it attracts a degree of inte-
rest in a specific area (either geographically, or professionally or in terms of industry).  
We have observed that although there are a multitude of ideas, whatever is incapable of 
survival does not deserve our attention (evolution and selection of mones). The unique 
pattern of the absence of human competencies and personality traits plays a significant 
role in this.  
Fortunately, the trade press is eager to track down whatever is unique. Due to its 
craving for novelty, there is an extensive base of watchdogs, allowing us to draw up a list 
of qualified candidates. Rather than in this respect, the problem arises concerning the 
evaluation of whether the organizational phenomenon emerging will actually be disruptive 
in the broader sense.  
We have been able to identify companies which, at least 10 years in retrospect, can 
well be defined as NCOs for research purposes. We have found that NCOs are typically 
innovative in more than a single area.  
Below is a list of examples (using the dimensions of the 4+2 formula), which is non-
exhaustive in terms of both its selection and the fields where the companies are 
outstanding. The selection is subjective.  
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1. Ford Co. – execution and innovation: the first to apply the assembly line technolo-
gy, laying the foundations of mass production; standardized tools for the assembly 
of parts; strategy: a car for everyone at an affordable price; leadership: paid high-
er wages than others, attention to workers’ rest2 (Wood and Wood, 2003b) 
2. General Motors – structure: Sloan created an implemented the first divisional or-
ganizational model (Wood and Wood, 2003a). 
3. ZARA (Inditex Group) – execution: shorter production cycle, faster logistics be-
tween stores (Ferdow, Lewis and Machusa, 2004) 
4. Toyota Co. – execution and innovation: strive for perfect quality, development of 
Lean management, Just in Time (JiT) system, Kaizen, SCM (Suply Chain Man-
agement) system, which today is a production system in its own right by the name 
of TPS (Toyota Product System), perhaps the only car manufacturer that can pro-
duce cars at a profit; culture: a definitive set of values focusing on quality orienta-
tion; strategy: focus on becoming the largest car manufacturer in the world and 
outperform every competitor in terms of quality; innovation: creation of the first 
hybrid car (Liker, 2004) 
5. The Metropolitan Opera – strategy and business model: go beyond the boundaries 
of a conventional “stone building”; execution and innovation: reliance on HD 
technology; mergers and partnerships: establishment of a world-wide network of 
theatres where the performances of MetOpera are available   
6. MIT OCW (OpenCourseWare) – strategy and business model: go beyond the bounda-
ries of a conventional “stone building”; execution and innovation: reliance on HD 
technology; mergers and partnerships: establishment of a world-wide network of 
universities; creation of a market for MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses) 
7. IKEA – strategy: assembly makes customers feel they own the products; execution: 
fewer warehousemen, because in logically constructed warehouses customers pick 
products and carry them to checkout 
8. UBER and airbnb: strategy and business model: implement (execution and inno-
vation) organization without real resources (cars and real property) for sharing be-
lievers, allowing the sale of taxi and hotel services; early precursors were 
Couchsurfing and SETIhome (the latter provided for the processing of data that 
required large computing capacities, using the computers of individuals at nights 
when they were not using them)  
9. Linux and Wikipedia: strategy and business model: implementation of large pro-
jects using now classic crowdsourcing 
10. Amazon: strategy and business model: the first to transfer the shopping experi-
ence into a virtual environment (first with books); execution: online banking and a 
solution for fast logistics (Stone, 2013) 
11. Grameen Bank (Nobel prize winning idea): strategy and business model: micro-
credit for the population in poverty, peer-to-peer and community financing (Mor-
duch, 1999) 
12. Apple: strategy and business model: develop a product that is not only useful but 
also beautiful; innovation: build an ecosystem for entertainment, leisure and learn-
ing, to be connected through Apple devices
3
 (Isaacson, 2011) 
                                                 
2
 http://grasshopper.com/blog/useful-business-lessons-from-henry-ford-historys-best-entrepreneur/ 
downloaded: 16/05/2016 
3
 http://www.forbes.com/sites/frederickallen/2011/11/07/the-three-principles-that-always-drove-
apple/#7c6bdecf4f1c downloaded: 16/05/2016 
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13. Dabba Wallah: execution: delivery of a daily 175,000 to 200,000 portions of 
food (Ravichandran, 2005); although addresses are colour coded as most employ-
ees are illiterate, there is 1 error per 8 million transactions (Pathak, 2010) 
14. Duolingo: strategy and business model: a free language learning service, where 
homework translations are distributed and when completed, rearranged by an al-
gorithm. The arranged homework translations are actually CNN news items, 
which are sold by Duolingo’s operator to CNN as translated news material, obvi-
ously in several languages
4
 
15. Goretex: leadership: continuously pushing the boundaries – Have you made an 
error today? (Carney and Getz, 2010) 
6. Is it good to have so few of them? 
Statistically, there cannot be many of them; that is the quick and simple answer to one 
half of the question. To the other half concerning whether this is good, we do not have 
such a quick and satisfactory answer. Cautious governments with intent to increase their 
own power have always wanted to build strong economies, one possible element of which 
is to enable increasing the level of enterprising competence and willingness for the 
population of entrepreneurs. This also means that when something (an organization, an 
idea, or an entrepreneur) manages to make the breakthrough from a specific environment 
and then repatriates the knowledge, experience and investment funds gained, this may 
contribute to such a level increase in the country of origin (see Estonia and the Skype 
effect). The higher the level, the more difficult the climb, yet climbers may have better 
chances to enter the global market, as they are much closer. The whole world is 
developing, which requires every national economy to keep up, otherwise the gap between 
the national economy and the world economy will widen.  
For a good number of good ideas that are useful and applicable in the market, basic 
research is required to lay the foundations (Satell, 2016)
5
. A close correlation appears to 
exist between educated people, spin-off research conducted at or around universities, and 
the success of future enterprises. Obviously, the formula comprises a number of factors 
and studies are required to clarify the concept of “close” and to provide quantitative data, 
which are beyond the scope of this paper.  
Nevertheless, the issue of measurability also needs to be addressed in respect of NCOs. 
This will be the next stage of our explorations. 
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